Analysis & Opinion

Why African Armies Should Consider Logistics Drones for Battlefield Resupply

The fighting around Sake and Goma in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in January 2025 exposed a basic logistics problem that runs through almost every African military deployment. Troops stay effective only as long as ammunition, medical supplies and other essential stores keep reaching them. Once those links break, weapons, vehicles and even well-trained personnel start to lose their value.

Sake is the clearest recent case, but it is not the only one. Across the continent, armies are fighting at the end of long, exposed and often hostile supply lines. A light, unmanned resupply capability for the last leg of those lines deserves serious study by African defence planners.

What Happened at Sake

The problem became plain as M23 forces moved towards Sake. The main operating base of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) came under growing pressure. Defence Minister Angie Motshekga later told Parliament that advancing forces had effectively surrounded the position. South African troops stayed in contact for several days under artillery and ground attack. Fourteen South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members were killed in the fighting around Sake and Goma, which fell to M23 on 28 January 2025.

Resupply soon became part of the problem. Reports at the time pointed to growing pressure on ammunition stocks and increasing difficulty in moving reinforcements and supplies by air. A resupply flight reportedly reached Goma on 26 January. After that, the worsening security situation and the loss of normal access to the airport made further support increasingly difficult, even as Pretoria rushed reinforcements towards the theatre.

The problem did not end when the heaviest fighting died down. By March 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa described the SANDF position in Sake and Goma as “precarious”. Negotiations with the forces controlling the surrounding area covered the movement of food and the provision of water and electricity. Keeping the force supplied had become part of the operational problem. That is one reason the mission, which ended in mid-March 2025, still draws mixed verdicts on the SANDF’s performance.

A continental problem

The same pattern appears far beyond the Kivus. In Mali, the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) turned supply routes into its main battlefield from September 2025. Bellingcat counted more than 130 fuel tankers destroyed in six verified attacks on routes from Senegal, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire towards Bamako. Convoys later moved only under heavy military escort with helicopter cover. Across the wider Sahel, jihadist groups have doubled the area in which they operate, leaving isolated garrisons that often depend on air resupply.

In north-east Nigeria, forward bases sit at the end of roads that insurgents mine and ambush. In Somalia, African Union troop contributors such as Uganda, which has just rotated a fresh battle group into the country, hold positions where road movement is slow and dangerous. In each case the question is the same as at Sake. What can a commander do when roads are cut, airfields are unavailable, and the normal means of moving supplies become too dangerous or simply cannot be used?

Drones could not have resolved what happened around Sake, and claiming otherwise would overstate the case. The circumstances were far more complex than a simple failure of resupply. The experience still raises a fair question about alternatives, and one option worth examining is a dedicated unmanned resupply capability for the final leg of the logistics chain.

Modest Loads, Urgent Needs

The requirement need not begin with a large or particularly sophisticated aircraft. A more useful starting point may be a platform that can carry 25 to 50 kg over a radius of roughly 50 to 100 km without a prepared runway.

Those figures are modest next to the capacity of a truck or transport helicopter, and that is the point. A cargo unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) should not be expected to replace either.

Bulk logistics will continue to depend on trucks, transport aircraft and helicopters. Small unmanned aircraft cannot realistically supply the fuel, water, large ammunition loads and daily needs of a deployed formation. A drone’s value lies in moving items that weigh comparatively little but are needed urgently.

Ammunition is the obvious example, but the requirement goes further. Medical stores, blood products, radio batteries, communications equipment and specialised components may all become critical once a unit is isolated. A broken part weighing a few kilograms can disable an important piece of equipment. The replacement does not need a truck. It needs a reliable way to get from the logistics base to the unit that is waiting for it.

Africa already knows this model works in civilian life. Zipline began delivering blood by drone in Rwanda in October 2016, and its Ghanaian operation now works alongside the military: the Ghana Navy has partnered Fly Zipline Ghana to recover drones and cargo lost over the country’s rivers. The step from medical logistics to tactical resupply is shorter than it looks.

The Last Tactical Mile

This is where the idea of the “last tactical mile” becomes useful.

Imagine a forward position 60 km from a secure base. In normal conditions the distance is no difficulty. Once hostile forces have mined, watched or occupied the road, the same 60 km becomes a serious logistics problem. A helicopter might still reach the position, but sending a crewed aircraft with a small load could expose people and an expensive platform to unnecessary risk. There may also be nowhere suitable to land.

A vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAV changes the commander’s options. A fixed-wing VTOL design could depart from a small logistics area, fly efficiently over the required distance and deliver directly to a forward position without a runway. A modular cargo bay would let the load change with circumstances.

The case grows stronger when the system is treated as a fleet rather than a single aircraft. Several smaller UAVs could be dispersed between logistics nodes. Losing one aircraft to failure or enemy action would reduce capacity without necessarily stopping the operation. The human cost is also different: losing an unmanned cargo aircraft is not comparable to losing a helicopter and its crew.

The Industrial Base Already Exists

The concept is within reach of the continent’s existing technology base, and South Africa offers the clearest example.

South African companies already cover a wide range of unmanned aviation. ALTI builds compact VTOL aircraft. Denel has long experience from the Seeker programme and has now unveiled its Skyler UAV at AAD 2026. Milkor has developed the much larger Milkor 380 and is working with Safran on sensors and navigation equipment for its UAVs. Paramount unveiled the V-Raven VTOL family at the Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) 2026 exhibition, and ShadowfaxUAS has launched the heavier SF45 fixed-wing VTOL drone. The Aerospace Industry Support Initiative (AISI), backed by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), is helping Kusasa Aerospace develop a drone payload delivery system designed to carry at least two 2 kg parcels and to work across several 30 kg-class drones.

None of these systems answers the logistics problem on its own. They were designed for different roles and occupy different parts of the UAV market. What they show is the depth of the domestic industrial base: South Africa already has experience in unmanned flight, composites, avionics, VTOL technology and systems integration. The South African Army is already acquiring new fixed-wing and rotary-wing drones for surveillance.

Other African producers are moving the same way. Nigeria is shifting from buying drones to building them with Turkish partners, and Egypt, Morocco and Kenya are building their own assembly capacity. The missing capability appears to sit somewhere between the smaller surveillance aircraft and the larger military UAVs. That gap deserves investigation before any procurement decision is made.

Testing Before Buying

An African army could start with a field trial built around a simple logistics problem. Set up a supply point, place forward elements at different distances and have participating systems move representative loads between them. The SANDF’s annual exercises at the Combat Training Centre, such as Exercise Vuk’uhlome V at Lohatla, offer a ready venue. Range and payload would matter, but so would the time needed to turn the aircraft round for another flight. A system that carries an impressive load but spends hours on the ground between sorties may prove less useful than a smaller aircraft that can fly again and again.

Maintenance would have to be considered from the outset. So would manpower.

A cargo drone meant for field use should not need a large technical team every time it moves. If operating it creates another complex supply and maintenance burden, part of its advantage is lost. The same applies to specialised launch equipment or fixed infrastructure. Much of the concept’s appeal lies in operating from austere locations, which matters for forces whose budgets are under constant pressure.

Trials would also need to move beyond ideal conditions.

Electronic warfare is now an ordinary feature of military operations. Interference with the Global Positioning System (GPS), disrupted communications and hostile counter-unmanned aircraft systems (counter-UAS) cannot be treated as unusual. A logistics aircraft that depends entirely on uninterrupted satellite navigation and a permanent data link may be of limited use once it enters a contested environment.

How it behaves after losing contact would therefore matter. So would its ability to follow a pre-programmed route and navigate when external systems become unreliable.

African conditions raise further practical questions. Heat and altitude reduce aircraft performance, from the Sahel to the eastern DRC highlands. Wind and rain may cut the load that can be carried or the distance that can be flown. Night operations bring another set of requirements. These factors should be tested in the field rather than taken from manufacturers’ specifications.

Honest About the Limits

There is also no reason to ignore the aircraft’s vulnerabilities. Cargo UAVs can be shot down. They can be jammed, detected or forced off course. Flying drones alongside artillery, helicopters and other aircraft creates an airspace management problem that would have to be solved. A logistics UAV does not remove the difficulties of battlefield resupply.

Its usefulness lies in offering an alternative when the usual options are limited.

For that reason, African armies should first define the problem they want industry to solve. The initial requirement could stay simple: move a militarily useful load over a tactically useful distance, operate without a runway, keep the ground-support requirement small, and keep enough autonomy to function when communications are unreliable.

Industry could then demonstrate what it can achieve.

This approach would also avoid building a procurement programme around a particular aircraft before the operational requirement has been properly tested. Payload, range and configuration should come out of experimentation rather than from assumptions about what the final system ought to look like.

Twenty-Five Kilograms at the Right Moment

The fighting around Sake deserves to be studied from this angle. Beyond the combat itself, it is a recent example of what happens when a deployed force finds its normal supply lines increasingly squeezed, and the Malian fuel blockade shows the same pressure applied on a national scale.

African armies will face these circumstances again. Peace-support operations can leave relatively small contingents far from established bases. Border deployments involve long distances and difficult terrain. Counter-insurgency campaigns from the Sahel to Cabo Delgado depend on garrisons that roads cannot always reach safely. Disaster relief may require supplies to reach communities after roads and bridges have failed.

In none of these situations would a cargo drone replace the existing logistics system. Its contribution would be narrower, but it could matter at the moment it counts most.

Sometimes the decisive requirement is not another truckload of supplies. It is 25 or 50 kg of the right supplies reaching the right position before the existing logistics system can get there. Sake, and the burned convoys on Mali’s roads, make a strong enough case for African armies to find out whether they should have that option.

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