FPV Kamikaze Drones in Sudan and the Sahel
First-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones started out as improvised experiments. In Sudan, Mali and the wider Sahel they are now a primary weapon for armies and insurgents alike, used to get past old air defences, hit armoured vehicles and kill personnel. Strap a warhead to a nimble racing quadcopter or a light fixed-wing airframe and you have a cheap guided weapon, with the operator watching the target through video goggles until impact.
How FPV drones work
A commercial surveillance quadcopter drops unguided munitions from a hover. An FPV drone is flown into the target like a guided missile, steered in real time by an operator wearing a headset fed by low-latency video from the nose camera. At 80 to 150 kilometres an hour, a good operator can fly it through a window, along a trench or into an open vehicle hatch before the charge goes off.
The parts are commercial: high-KV brushless motors and high-discharge lithium-polymer batteries. The warhead is often a modified RPG round, typically a PG-7V anti-tank shaped charge, or an improvised fragmentation charge. A complete strike drone often costs less than $600, used against combat vehicles, mobile artillery or command posts worth millions.
Sudan and the Sahel
Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is one of the most intense drone fights on the continent. Both sides fly FPV quadcopters alongside long-range delta-wing suicide drones to break stalemates, in cities such as Khartoum and Omdurman and in rural Darfur and Kordofan. SAF troops use FPVs against snipers, RSF technicals and fortified urban positions. The RSF uses suicide drones on fuel depots, airstrips and supply convoys, carrying the war into regions that had been stable.
In the Sahel, armed groups got there first. The Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the jihadist Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) flew FPV drones hard against government outposts at Anéfis, Aguelhok and Kidal in northern Mali. The strikes damaged facilities, disrupted supply and helped push Malian troops and Russia’s Africa Corps out. Insurgents in Mali have also fielded fibre-optic FPVs that trail a hair-thin glass cable. With no radio link to jam, the operator keeps video and control through the heaviest electronic countermeasures.
Africa Corps and the Malian army answered with FPV programmes of their own in the north. With imported components and locally trained crews, government forces now hit rebel staging areas, hidden mortar pits and fast motorised patrols.
Footage as a weapon
Every FPV strike films itself. The last seconds of video, right up to impact, go straight onto social media, where armies and insurgents use them to prove battle damage, recruit and demoralise the other side. A few hundred dollars of commercial drone knocking out an armoured vehicle makes a persuasive clip.
For African defence planners the problem is growing. Conventional air defence radars struggle to track small quadcopters hugging the terrain, and fibre-optic tethers and pre-programmed terminal guidance blunt the jamming guns most forces rely on. Countering FPV suicide drones will take layered point defences: acoustic sensors, automated optical tracking, short-range shotguns and wire netting over key sites and armoured columns.

