Combat & Strike UAVs

The Proliferation of Long-Range Delta-Wing Drones in Sudan

Long-range one-way attack (OWA) drones have turned Sudan’s war from a ground stalemate into a deep-strike campaign. Delta-wing suicide drones with ranges beyond 1,000 kilometres let both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) hit airbases, fuel infrastructure and command centres far behind the front.

How the delta wings work

The delta layout suits long, low flights. A swept triangular wing blended into a short fuselage gives good lift for its drag and a small radar signature. A two-stroke petrol engine drives a rear pusher propeller, and the aircraft cruise at 150 to 180 kilometres an hour.

Three families matter in Sudan. The RSF’s heavy strike weapons are the Chinese-designed Sunflower-200 and ZT-180, cropped delta wings that closely copy Iran’s Shahed-136. The Sunflower-200 weighs about 175 to 200 kilograms and carries a 40 to 50 kilogram blast-fragmentation warhead over 1,500 to 2,500 kilometres. The SAF flies the locally assembled Safrouq, with a 600-kilometre strike radius and a 30-kilogram warhead meant for armour and fortified command posts. Iranian-origin Shahed derivatives and other single-use types fill out both arsenals, built from commercial parts and simple composite airframes to keep unit costs down.

The RSF’s launch base at Nyala

From Nyala Airport and nearby sites in South Darfur, the RSF can reach the whole country. Crews fire Sunflower-200 and ZT-180 drones from multi-rail truck launchers at SAF targets in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Merowe Air Base in Northern State and command posts in Singa and El Obeid.

Satellite imagery from mid-2026 showed more than 80 loitering munition airframes and active launchers near Nyala. The RSF has turned an inland regional airport into a strike hub that can reach targets more than 1,200 kilometres away.

The SAF’s answer: Safrouq

SAF engineers built the Safrouq to counter RSF electronic warfare, in particular Belarusian-supplied Groza-S jamming suites. It pairs hardened anti-jam satellite navigation receivers with a low-cost inertial navigation system, so it holds its course through heavy broad-spectrum interference.

SAF units fly it alongside medium-altitude reconnaissance drones against RSF convoys, troop concentrations and fuel dumps in Khartoum, Gezira State and Kordofan.

Hard to stop, easy to misdirect

These drones are difficult to intercept. At 100 to 300 metres above the ground, small pusher-prop airframes slip under long-range early warning radars. And firing a multi-million-dollar surface-to-air missile at a drone that costs less than $30,000 is a losing trade.

Most long-range delta-wing suicide drones fly to pre-programmed GPS coordinates with no optical terminal guidance. Navigation drift or stale intelligence sends them into the wrong targets. Data from mid-2026 attributes a large share of casualties in residential areas, power stations and medical facilities in Sudan to one-way attack drones.

Unmanned Africa

Unmanned Africa is Africa's premier dedicated media and intelligence platform covering military unmanned systems (UAVs), drones, counter-UAV technologies, robotics, and autonomous systems across the continent.

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