Nigeria’s Scramble for Counter-Drone Capability
Nigeria is building a counter-drone capability along two tracks. One runs through the Nigerian Air Force’s own procurement and training. The other runs through a group of home-grown defence-technology startups the military has started to rely on directly. Both answer the same problem. In barely two years, Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have gone from flying commercial drones for reconnaissance to dropping explosives from them, and Nigeria’s air defences were never designed for that.
Wajiroko and after
The turning point came on 24 December 2024, when four drones carrying locally modified grenades hit a Nigerian forward operating base at Wajiroko in Borno State. It was the first confirmed combat use of armed drones by a Lake Chad Basin militant group. More armed-drone attacks followed within days at Damaturu and Abadam.
By January 2026, open-source trackers were reporting about 35 more drones smuggled into the region along Lake Chad corridor routes, and interviews by the Institute for Security Studies pointed to foreign Islamic State trainers helping local fighters adapt the tactics. Independent incident trackers cited by Military Africa put the rise in documented drone incidents since 2024 at roughly six-fold. Centralised, conventional air defences are a poor match for a threat built from parts bought online for a few hundred dollars.
The Air Force track
The air force’s most visible step is a training programme on what it calls the 612A Anti-UAV Radar System. It was inaugurated on 26 July 2025 at the headquarters of the Air Component for Operation Hadin Kai in Maiduguri, under the then Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Bala Abubakar, and graduated its first cohort that October. The air force says the system detects the low, slow and small targets conventional radar tends to miss.
Nobody outside the air force has matched the 612A designation to a known radar. Military Africa has suggested it may be a local name for newly acquired equipment rather than a manufacturer’s model number. Even basic order-of-battle details are hard to pin down in African procurement. Air Marshal Sunday Aneke succeeded Abubakar on 30 October 2025 and has since folded counter-drone work into a wider National Threat Assessment and security-planning process with the other service chiefs.
Alongside the radar, Nigeria has fielded the Lithuanian-made EDM4S SkyWiper from NT Service, a handheld jammer first shown in 2019 that cuts the control, telemetry and navigation links between a drone and its operator. It is usually paired with NT Service’s Wingman detector. Thales Ground Observer 12 radars, delivered in 2019 for battlefield and border surveillance, add Ku-band pulse-Doppler coverage and now double as low-level drone detectors.
The startup track
The second track is distinctly Nigerian: domestic startups building counter-drone hardware from scratch. The best known is Terra Industries, founded in Abuja in 2024 by Nathan Nwachuku and Maxwell Maduka. It is now the continent’s most heavily funded defence-technology startup, with more than $50 million in seed funding by August 2026 from investors including 8VC and Lux Capital.
Terra makes the Archer, a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) surveillance and strike drone, and the Iroko tactical UAV. Its counter-drone product is Kama, an interceptor the company says can chase down and disable hostile aircraft at up to 300 kilometres an hour. The existing Abuja factory, Pax-1, is being joined by a larger plant in Accra, Ghana, due to reach full operation around mid-2026 and eventually turn out up to 50,000 units a year. Terra pitches that scale-up at drone attacks across the wider Sahel, not Nigeria alone.
Terra is not alone. Babasky Technologies, the defence arm of Nigerian conglomerate UNICCON Group, runs its own counter-drone programme linked to the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), pairing a detection-and-jamming system with a companion strike drone. Unmanned Africa covered that project in detail when it was demonstrated in August 2026. Nigeria now has at least two credible, well-funded domestic counter-drone efforts running on top of whatever the air force imports.
Fast enough?
Nobody knows yet. Market analysts put counter-drone spending growth across the continent at more than 27 percent a year through 2030, and Nigeria’s build-up matches a pattern from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, where forces are moving from ad hoc handheld jammers to layered detection and defeat systems.
The economics still favour the insurgents. An ISWAP or Boko Haram cell can build a working strike drone for a few hundred to a couple of thousand dollars. A single radar or jamming installation of the kind Nigeria is buying can cost hundreds of thousands. Armed groups also adapt fast: frequency-hopping firmware, and in Mali and the wider Sahel, fibre-optic tethers that make radio jamming useless. Nigerian planners will have to get ahead of that curve.
What stands out is who is building Nigeria’s answer. A state air force training on imported radars and a group of startups designing interceptors from scratch rarely belong to the same procurement story. In the northeast, both have become necessary, and neither looks enough on its own.

