Where Africa’s Armies buy their Drones, and who they rely on
Ten African countries buy all of their military drones from a single country. Somalia, Burkina Faso, Djibouti and Togo get every one from Turkey. Benin, Mozambique, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo get theirs from China. Botswana relies entirely on Israel, Burundi entirely on the United States. On paper the ten look identical: total dependence, with nowhere else to go if the relationship sours. In practice they are very different cases, and working out why says more about Africa’s drone market than the percentages do.
Who sells Africa its drones
Start with the suppliers. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which tracks drone deals using Military Africa’s procurement data, counts 32 Turkish drone agreements with African governments, 28 of them since 2021, making Turkey the continent’s most active supplier by a distance. China follows with 27, Israel with 18, the United States with 15 and Iran with 9. That ranking explains most of the ten single-supplier countries at once. Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Somalia and Togo sit wholly inside Turkey’s fast-growing sales network; Benin, DR Congo, Mozambique and Namibia sit wholly inside China’s. These countries did not end up with one supplier by accident. They made their first, and so far only, purchases from whichever of the two most aggressive sellers in Africa reached them first.
Somalia: dependence beyond hardware
Somalia is the deepest of the Turkish cases, and its dependence goes well past equipment. Turkey has run its largest overseas base, TURKSOM, in Mogadishu since 2017. It has sold Somalia everything from Bayraktar TB2s to AKINCI strategic strike drones, and by early 2026 it was flying its own F-16s and sending its own ground troops into combat against al-Shabaab. A DefenceWeb analysis compared Somalia with Morocco, which made Turkey build a production facility on Moroccan soil before it could service its aircraft there. Somalia won no such concession and reportedly still relies on Turkish personnel to fly drones it nominally owns. In Mogadishu, 100 percent reliance looks more like a client relationship than a supply chain. Djibouti and Togo, which have taken smaller, less publicised Turkish deliveries, score the same but almost certainly carry far less of that entanglement, simply because they have bought far less.



Botswana and Burundi: two different kinds of 100 percent
The other two single-supplier countries, Botswana with Israel and Burundi with the United States, stand out for opposite reasons. Israel’s Bluebird Aero Systems has built a real presence in southern and eastern Africa with its WanderB vertical take-off surveillance drone, one of the most widely adopted tactical platforms on the continent according to the Africa Center. That probably explains why Botswana, and to a lesser degree Zambia and Uganda further along the diversification scale, show Israel as a leading supplier, even though Israel rarely features in African drone coverage the way Turkey and China do.
Burundi is more mundane than it looks. Its only recorded drone transfer is a 2011 US military aid package worth 45 million dollars, shared with Uganda, that included four small surveillance drones for counter-terrorism work linked to the African Union mission in Somalia. Fifteen years with no follow-on purchase is not deep strategic dependence. It is one thin, ageing data point that scores the same as a real patron relationship once it is boiled down to a percentage. The lesson applies widely: a Herfindahl score of 100 can describe a country locked into one supplier for a decade, or a country that has never had a reason to buy a second batch from anyone.
Ivory Coast, Chad and Mauritania: diversifying on purpose
A group of West and Central African states shows what deliberate diversification looks like. Ivory Coast, Chad and Mauritania sit between 64 and 67 percent, with France still recorded as their largest historical supplier, and all three are visibly moving away from that relationship. Ivory Coast took European-funded surveillance drones, confirmed Chinese Wing Loong II purchases and opened talks with the US military about a drone facility, all within about eighteen months of France pulling out its last combat troops in 2025. Chad has added Chinese CH-4s to a fleet built around Turkish Bayraktar and Aksungur aircraft, covering Boko Haram in the west and spillover from Sudan’s war in the east. Mauritania’s drones come mostly from China, but its defence minister was meeting Turkish officials in Istanbul in May 2026. None of the three depends on one direction. All three are shopping.
South Africa and Tunisia: the number needs the name
South Africa and Tunisia sit at opposite ends of the table and make the same point: a high reliance score is not automatically bad, and a low one is not automatically good, once you know who the supplier is. South Africa is 95 percent reliant on South Africa. That looks like the same concentration as Somalia’s dependence on Turkey and is the reverse of it. It reflects Denel’s long-running aerospace programmes and the newer Milkor 380, the largest home-designed drone on the continent. South Africa’s near-total concentration describes sovereignty, not dependence.
Tunisia is only 22 percent reliant on its own production and is the most diversified buyer on the list. That reflects a genuinely mixed set of foreign suppliers and a small but real domestic sector: the Tunisian firm ENOVA Robotics has exported dozens of ground security robots to the United States, a rare case of the trade running the other way. Deep self-reliance and deliberate diversification look nothing alike on paper, but they solve the same problem from opposite ends.
Sudan and Libya: two governments, two arsenals
Sudan and Libya appear twice because their wars have split their buying in two. Sudan’s government gets roughly half its drones from Iran, with Turkish and Chinese purchases on top, while the Rapid Support Forces it has fought since 2023 get 81 percent of their separate arsenal from China, paid for by the United Arab Emirates according to UN reporting. The Africa Center’s tracking adds something neither side’s score shows: Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation has unveiled its own FPV loitering munition, the Kamin-25, so the state side now makes weapons as well as importing them. Libya repeats the pattern on a smaller scale. The Tripoli government buys from Turkey, Israel and Austria; the rival eastern administration depends overwhelmingly on China. In both countries, one national score would hide two governments buying two arsenals from two different parts of the world.
What the Herfindahl Index misses
The Herfindahl Index is a sound tool, but it needs a second question beside it: reliant on whom, and why? Total concentration in your own industry and total concentration in a foreign patron’s catalogue give the same number and opposite outcomes. The countries to watch are those like Ivory Coast, Chad and Mauritania moving between suppliers, and those like Somalia where a high score now looks less like a market and more like an arrangement.

