Africa’s Emerging Drone Buyers: Eight Countries Accelerating Fast
In March 2025 a Turkish military transport landed in Mogadishu carrying two large, missile-armed drones. They were Bayraktar AKINCIs, among the most capable attack drones in the world, and they were meant as a warning to al-Shabaab, which has fought the Somali government for nearly two decades. They also carried a message for Washington. Days earlier Somalia’s president had fired his defence minister after the United States pressed him to step back from Turkey and move toward America’s regional partner, the UAE. The drones arrived anyway. Across Africa, more governments are buying serious military drones for the first time, or buying many more very quickly, and their reasons say as much about the competing powers as about the buyers.

Eight buyers speeding up
Somalia is the most striking case, not the only one. New procurement figures show at least eight African countries or forces buying far more drones in the past three years than in the three before. Some jumps are large on paper. Chad’s inventory has grown more than four and a half times, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s civil war have more than quadrupled theirs. Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritania, Somalia and Libya’s Tripoli government went from no recorded purchases in the earlier period to a handful now. In percentage terms that is an infinite increase; in plain terms these countries are starting drone programmes from nothing. A country buying its first six drones is telling a different story from one doubling a fleet it already had.
Turkey’s hand in the new buyers
One supplier keeps turning up on that list: Turkey, whose rise alongside China to dominate the continent’s drone market is changing air power well beyond any one war. Kenya received six Bayraktar TB2 drones in the last days of 2024 to deal with al-Shabaab near its northern border, and in 2026 deepened its ties with Ankara. Libya’s Tripoli government has relied on Turkish drones for years to hold off a rival force in the east backed by Russia and Gulf states. Chad’s fleet mixes Turkish aircraft with newer Chinese drones spotted at an airbase near the Sudanese border, as N’Djamena tries to cover Boko Haram in the west and spillover from Sudan in the east. Somalia goes deepest. Turkey has run its largest overseas base there since 2017, and by early 2026 had sent its own fighter jets and ground troops into combat against al-Shabaab, on top of what it has sold Mogadishu. Turkey has become the world’s most aggressive drone seller, offering capable weapons without the political conditions Western governments usually attach, and many African militaries have accepted.
Hedging in Ivory Coast and Mauritania
Not everyone on the list is moving into Turkey’s orbit. Some are spreading their purchases across as many suppliers as they can. Ivory Coast is the clearest example. After France withdrew its last combat troops in early 2025, ending decades of military partnership, Abidjan did not pick one new patron. It took European-funded surveillance drones in February 2026, confirmed a purchase of Chinese Wing Loong attack drones months later, and has spent more than a year in talks with the US military about hosting a drone base. One regional intelligence analysis suggested Ivorian officials know Chinese drones have a patchy reliability record elsewhere in Africa and are spreading the risk on purpose. Mauritania looks similar. Its current drones came from China, but its defence minister was in Istanbul meeting Turkish officials in May 2026, a sign Beijing’s hold may not last.
Sudan: two buyers, one war
Sudan appears on the list twice: once as the internationally recognised government and once as the Rapid Support Forces it has fought since 2023. That is not a data quirk. Both sides have spent three years racing to buy drones, the government mainly from Iran and Turkey, the RSF flying Chinese-made aircraft that UN investigators say the United Arab Emirates paid for. A war with two competing buyers shows up in the figures as two buyers.
What does a foreign drone leave behind?
The harder question is not who bought what but whether buying a foreign drone leaves a country any more able to stand on its own. Somalia compares badly here, as a recent DefenceWeb investigation set out. Morocco started in almost the same place in 2021, buying its first Bayraktar drones straight from Turkey. But Moroccan law required foreign manufacturers to set up locally before servicing equipment in the country, so Ankara built a production facility outside Rabat, and Morocco gained a small but real share of the manufacturing. Somalia had no such rule and won no such concession, and by some accounts still depends on Turkish personnel to fly the drones it nominally owns. Same aircraft, same supplier, very different results. Unit counts and growth rates show who is spending. They do not show who, five years from now, will be able to fly, fix or replace what they bought.

